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www.cambridge.org © in this web service Cambridge University Press Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-85460-3 -Freedom and Criminal Responsibility in American Legal Thought Thomas Andrew Green Frontmatter More information xi I have incurred many debts over the long period during which this book evolved from a study of the criminal trial jury in the nineteenth-and twentieth-century United States to one on ideas about freedom and criminal responsibility in the twentieth-century United States, with the jury as no more than a leitmotif that appears, where relevant, at selected points throughout the text. Some of my student research assistants contributed to early stages, others to later ones, of this evolution. I express my gratitude to them all, whether or not their research help ended up on the cutting-room fl oor (to be recovered for use in future work on the relationship between the jury and ideas about criminal responsibility): Isabelle Antongiorgi, David Blanchard, Kelly Bozanic, Carolyn Frantz, Joseph Gonzalez, Jeffrey Jones, Jessica Lieberman, Kristin Olbertson, Matthew Perry, Adam Sloane, and Lu Zhang.
A second sort of evolutionary process took place during the later stages, when, over a number of years, I undertook a series of revisions of the original completed text. I could not have managed these revisions -and the major transformation they resulted in -without the help of two extraordinarily talented and hardworking research/editorial assistants, fi rst Ellen Poteet and subsequently Merrill Hodnefi eld. Ellen and Merrill each came to know the entire subject matter of this work as well as I did: each was subjected to years of my lectures and musings, as well as, of course, to constant rereadings of successive versions of the manuscript. Each left her mark on the fi nal manuscript. It is fair to say that many passages, especially in Part II , were talked out, reasoned over, and written jointly by Ellen and me; many others throughout the book -especially in Part III -were handled in the same way by Merrill and me. In addition, Merrill took the lead, working from my outlines (but often extending my envisioned coverage), in drafting substantial sections of the introductions to each of the three parts. Finally, Merrill composed the indexes. ters at crucial moments. And I am grateful to Susanna Blumenthal, Charles Eisendrath, Terrance Sandalow, and Rebecca Scott for many conversations over many years on one or another aspect of the freedom issue. Finally, for an academic lifetime of free will/determinism discussions, I am forever indebted to Peter Westen. (Peter advises me to stop thinking about the matter, but -please don't spread this around -he's a secret enabler.)
Generations of Michigan Law School and History Department students actually paid tuition to hear me talk about the subject matter of this book, as have students at the University of Nebraska College of Law, the Tel Aviv University Law School, and the University of Hawaii Law School. Collectively, these (and other) students have enriched my life and improved my work. That's true as well for students in several seminars in American Legal History at Princeton taught by Hendrik Hartog. I owe Dirk a very great deal for advice and encouragement, and for his use of successive drafts of the manuscript in his teaching.
Along the way, I have had much appreciated suggestions from David Hollinger and Edward Purcell regarding background reading in American intellectual history. At various stages I received valuable editorial help from Terre Fisher, Benjamin Friedman, Alexandra Gross, Brittany Harrison, and Ruth Homrighaus.
There cannot be a better informed, more effi cient, or easier-to-workwith academic law library staff than that at the University of Michigan Law School. I very much appreciate everything that they have done for me over the years. Special thanks to Jocelyn Kennedy. And for wonderful faculty assistance over the years I thank Sharon Rice, Kimberley Latta, Rose Maten, and especially my current assistant, Dara Faris.
My editor at Cambridge University Press and longtime friend and professional colleague, Lewis Bateman, has offered excellent advice and extended great encouragement, for which I am greatly indebted. Thanks, too, for the abundant help given me by his assistant, Shaun Vigil, and for the insightful readings and advice of two anonymous readers for the Press.
I want also to recognize here the generous support I have received in connection with the early (American jury-based) stages of this long-range
